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ARTICLES
The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions on Federal and State Securities
Regulation
Marc I. Steinbere
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a decision that delighted "deep pockets," shocked the
plaintiffs' bar, and befuddled neutral observers,' the Supreme
Court in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver?
held that aiding and abetting liability in private actions may not
be imposed under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 s ("Exchange Act") or under rule 10b-5.4 The Court's decision swept away decades of lower court precedent that nearly universally recognized the propriety of such secondary liability under
the statute and rule.' Unless Congress swiftly acts to counter the
Court's decision,6 Central Bank of Denver will adversely affect the
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1 See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Ruling Sharply Curbs Suits on Securities Fraud, N.Y.
TIMEs, April 20, 1994, at Al; John F. Olson, et al., The End of the Section 10(b) Aiding and
Abetting Liability iction, 8 INSIGHTS 3 (June 1994); Amy Stevens, 'Aiding-and-Abetting' Ruling
by High Court is Gtift to Some Firms, WAL ST. J., April 22, 1994, at B3; see also Paul M.
Barrett, Justices Deal Investors a Blow in Certain Suits, WALL ST. J., April 20, 1994, at A2.
2 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
5 See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); I1T v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co.,
579 F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147
(7th Cir. 1969); Olson, supra note 1, at 3 (IThe Court's decision overruled decisions
from 11 federal courts of appeals which had recognized Section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability.").
6 See Barrett supra note 1, at A2 ("In Congress, the SEC's backers were wary of attacking the high court's action for fear they would open the door to attempts to further
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Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") enforcement program 7 and the ability of private claimants to receive just recompense from blameworthy collateral participants.'
The Court's decision displays a rigidity and callousness that is
disconcerting. While supposedly adhering to a strict statutory construction,9 the Court misconstrues its own precedent.' ° Along
with other recent high court decisions that narrow the scope of
the federal securities laws," Central Bank of Denver will increasingly
prompt allegedly aggrieved litigants to bring suit in state courts.'
Perhaps this tact has been the Court's objective for well over a
decade. If so, the Court is effectuating this strategy with mechanistic efficiency."

limit investors' rights to sue."). Legislation has been introduced in Congress covering
other aspects of securities litigation, including section 10(b)'s statute of limitations and
attorneys' fees. See S. 1976, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1994), discussed in 26 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 440 (1994); infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. On the contrary, the SEC's General
Counsel Simon Lome has opined that the decision "was not likely to 'affect fundamentally the commission's enforcement program.'" Greenhouse, supra note 1, at C6 (quoting
SEC General Counsel Simon Lome).
8 Greenhouse, supra note 1, at Al (paraphrasing former SEC Commissioner A.A.
Sommer, Jr.). See infra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
9 See 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446-48 (1994).
10 1d. at 1449-50, 1452-53. See infta notes 34-51 and accompanying text. The Court
misconstrues the following decisions: Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988);
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); and Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). Professor Bromberg likewise has criticized the Court's "simplistic and overly literal rationale . . . indifference to legislative
history, disdain for lower court precedent, and highly selective use of the Court's own
precedents with little or no effort to distinguish its cases that point the other way." Alan
R. Bromberg, Aiding and Abetting. Sudden Death and Possible Resurrection, 24 REV. SEC. &
COMM. REG. 133, 139 (1994). See also Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative
Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 557 (1982).
11 See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
359-61 (1991) (adopting statute of limitations of one year after discovery and no longer
than three years after the violation for § 10(b) actions), reh'g denie, 501 U.S. 1277
(1991); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that absent a duty
to disclose based on a fiduciary or similar relationship, silence does not give rise to liability); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (requiring that scienter be
shown in § 10(b) private actions), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976); see generally ALAN R.
BROMBERG & Louis LowENtELS, SECuRiTIEs FRAUD AND COMMODmES FRAUD (1994); 5B
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-5 (1994).
12 See Marc I. Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for
Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 395, 418-28 (1993) (presented as the Inaugural Visiting
Charles F. Hartsock Professor of Law); infra notes 103-58 and accompanying text.
13 See 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1454 (1994) (referring to the "uncertainty" and "excessive litigation" of § 10(b) actions); Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1096
(1991) (stating that recognizing plaintiff's causation theory under § 14(a) would produce
hazy issues, giving rise to protracted litigation); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,
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This Article focuses on recent Supreme Court decisions construing the federal securities laws and thereafter turns to the ramifications of those decisions from both a government enforcement
and private complainant perspective. Theories and strategies that
should be pursued by such litigants are addressed. The federalstate relationship, invoking notions of federalism, remains a key
ingredient in this mix.
II. ADHERENCE TO A STRIcr STATUTORY APPROACH
In the last two decades, the Supreme Court has adhered to a
strict statutory approach with varying degrees of enthusiasm. For
example, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,4 the Court principally
focused on the language of section 10(b) to hold that scienter 5
must be proven in private actions brought under that provision. 6
Four years later, the Court relied on a strict linguistic approach in
Aaron v. SEC ' to require that the SEC show scienter in its enforcement actions based on alleged violations of section 10(b)."

In the implied rights area, the Court similarly embraced strict construction, opining in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redingtoni9 that "[t]he
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, ei-

556 (1982) (stating that "Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to
provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) (stating that "litigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a danger of
vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in
general."), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
14 425 U.S. 185 (1976), reh' denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
15 The Court defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980). A question
left open in both Aaron and Hochfelder was whether reckless conduct constitutes scienter.
See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 686 n.5; Hochflder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. With respect to principal
liability, the lower federal courts overwhelmingly, if not unanimously, have affirmatively
answered this question. See, e.g., Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 296
(5th Cir. 1990); IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d Cir. 1980); Sundstrand Corp. v.
Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1977); MARC I. STEINBERG,.SECURMES
REGULATION: LABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 7.02 (1994) (cases cited).
16 425 U.S. at 197 (stating that "the words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct.").
17 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
18 Id. at 689-95 (stating that based on the rationale of Hochfelder, "plain meaning of
the language of § 10(b) . . . . ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an
element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought.").
19 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (declining to imply a private remedy under § 17(a) of the
Exchange Act).
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ther expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.""
More recently in Virginia Bankshares, the Court gave approbation
to this approach.2 '
Nonetheless, a number of the Court's decisions took an approach grounded in significant part on policy concerns and flexible use of legislative history. United States v. Naftalin22 is a key example. Holding that the scope of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933" reached the defendant's conduct,24 the Court (relying in part on statutory language) turned to Congress' broad
predominant objectives in enacting the Securities Act: protecting
investors and achieving ethical standards in the securities industry.2" Application of a broader policy-based standard premised on
more flexible principles of statutory construction is also exemplified by the Court's decision in Herman & MacLean v.
20 Id. at 575. Accord Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24
(1979) (asserting that "[t]he dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to
create any such remedy [and] . . . [having answered that question in the negative, our
inquiry is at an end.").
For a more expansive decision during that era, which applied the principles of Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)
(implying a private right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972). For a key appellate court decision that followed somewhat uncertain Supreme
Court precedent during this period in the securities law area, see Landry v. All Am.
Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982) (declining to imply private right of action
under § 17(a) of the Securities Act). See., e.g., Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67
VA. L. REV. 553 (1981); Thomas L. Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes:
Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium - Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33
VAND. L. REv. 1333 (1980); Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal
Law, 55 NORE DAME LAW. 33 (1979).
21 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991) (stating that
"[t]he rule that has emerged . . . is that recognition of any private right of action for
violating a federal statute must ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private remedy."). See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted) ("[W]e effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, converting one
of [Cort's] four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other
three merely indicative of its presence or absence."); Marc I. Steinberg & William A.
Reece, The Supreme Court, Implied Rights of Action and Proxy Regulation, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 67,
81 (1993) (stating that, with respect to the view held by some that the Cort test retained
vitality, the Court's lirginia Bankshares decision "appears to have vitiated this perception.").
22 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
23 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988).
24 441 U.S. at 773-78.
25 Id. at 775-76 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186-87 (1963) (Investment Advisors Act of 1940 intended to mandate disclosure (rather
than caveat emptor) to achieve high ethical standards in securities industry)). For further
discussion addressing Nafialin's ramifications, see Marc . Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J. 163 (1979).
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Huddleston.28 There, the Court applied this approach to hold that
the plaintiff could institute an action under section 10(b) even
though section 11 of the Securities Act27 covered the same type
of conduct." Furthermore, the Huddleston court embraced the
congressional reenactment theory.'
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its restrictive approach in its
0 The Court's five-member
1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver."
majority adhered to a strict statutory construction in holding that
aiding and abetting liability cannot be invoked in private actions
under section 10(b). Assessing the statute's language, the Court
reasoned that "the statutory text controls the definition of conduct
covered by § 10(b)." 3t Because the text of the Exchange Act
"does not itself" encompass aiders and abettors, "that conclusion
resolves the case." 2 Accordingly, "the statute itself' is determinative that liability cannot be imposed upon aiders and abettors.3
In reaching this conclusion, the Court found it unnecessary to
examine the pertinent legislative history' since the applicable
statute's text resolved the issue." Policy considerations cannot
override a court's interpretation of a statute's (or Act's) text and
structure unless such considerations indicate that "adherence to
the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Con-

26 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
27 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
28 459 U.S. at 383 ("It would be anomalous indeed if the special protection afforded
to purchasers in a registered offering by the 1933 Act were deemed to deprive such
purchasers of the protections against manipulation and deception that Section 10(b)
makes available to all persons who deal in securities.").
29 Id. at 383-87. See infra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
30 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
31 Id. at 1447.
32 Id at 1448. See Bromberg, supra note 10, at 139 (asserting that the Court's opinion was "flawed" and "based on a simplistic and overly literal rationale: if it's not explicit
in the statute, it doesn't exist.").
33 114 S. Ct. at 1447-48 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993);
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980);
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).
34 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
35 The pertinent legislative history evidently is that of the Congress which enacted
the legislation. 114 S. Ct. at 1448 ("When the text of § 10(b) does not resolve a particular issue, we attempt to infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue
had the 101>5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934 Act.'" (quoting
Musick Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993))). Note,
however, that under certain limited circumstances, subsequent legislative history and policy considerations may be taken into account. See 114 S. Ct. at 1452-55.
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gress could not have intended it." 36 In sum, the Court's rationale

in Central Bank of Denver embraces a strict textual approach, which
militates against implication of private rights of action.
Although not specifically addressing the implication of private
rights of action, the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of
Denver evidently constricts the congressional reenactment doctrine.
This doctrine was set forth in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
7
3

Inc. v. Curran:

[W] e must examine Congress' perception of the law that it was
shaping and reshaping. When Congress enacts new legislation,
the question is whether Congress intended to create a private
remedy as a supplement to the express enforcement provisions
of the statute. When Congress acts in a statutory context in
which an implied private remedy has already been recognized
by the courts, however, the inquiry logically is different. Congress need not have intended to create a new remedy, since
one already existed; the question is whether Congress intended
to preserve the preexisting remedy.ss
The Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver may be read as
a repudiation of the doctrine broadly enunciated in Curran and
reaffirmed in Huddleston.9 Rather than focusing on the 1975
Amendments which constituted a significant revision of the federal
securities laws,' the majority in Central Bank of Denver ascertained
whether Congress had reenacted the language of the statute at

36 114 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)).
37 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
38 Id. at 378-79. The Court reaffirmed the congressional reenactment theory in
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). Opting for a cumulative construction of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the Court reasoned:
[W]hen Congress comprehensively revised the securities laws in 1975, a consistent line of judicial decisions had permitted plaintiffs to sue under Section 10(b)
regardless of the availability of express remedies. In 1975 Congress enacted the
'most substantial and significant revision of this country's Federal securities laws
since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' .. . When Congress
acted, federal courts had consistently and routinely permitted a plaintiff to proceed under Section 10(b) even where express remedies under Section 11 or
other provisions were available. In light of this well-established judicial interpretation, Congress' decision to leave Section 10(b) intact suggests that Congress
ratified the cumulative nature of the Section 10(b) action.
Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted). See Marc I. Steinberg, The Prpriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 557 (1982).
39 See 114 S. Ct. at 1452-53; infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
40 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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issue, namely, section 10(b). 4 Since Congress had not done so,
the congressional reenactment doctrine was deemed unavailing.42
This narrow construction of the doctrine, focusing on the'
particular statutory provision at issue rather than the Securities
Acts in general, would eviscerate the doctrine if followed in subsequent cases. A situation would rarely arise which would call for
the doctrine's application. As set forth in Central Bank of Denver,
the congressional reenactment doctrine applies only in situations
where Congress has reenacted the particular provision. 43 Generally, such reenactment occurs when Congress attempts to make a
relatively minor modification, such as a clarifying or technical
change in a particular statute"4 or when Congress makes a more
substantive revision. 45 In the first situation, it belies reality to assert that Congress, when it enacts such clarifying or technical
amendments, is aware of the applicable case law. In the latter
scenario, Congress focuses on the particular statutory provision
from a substantive standpoint and amends that provision to reflect
its intent.46 Accordingly, the statute and its accompanying legisla-

41 114 S. Ct. at 1452 ("When Congress reenacts statutory language that has been
given a consistent judicial construction, we often adhere to that construction in interpreting the reenacted statutory language." (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2035 (1993); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 580-81 (1978))).
The Court acknowledged that "our cases have not been consistent in rejecting arguments such as these [citing Curran among other cases] ....
We therefore reject them."
114 S. Ct. at 1453 (citations omitted). Although unlikely to succeed, it may be argued
that Central Bank of Denver construed the scope of section 10(b) and not the implication
of a private right of action. Id. at 1452-53. Therefore, the assertion may be made that
the congressional reenactment doctrine and the decisions reflecting the doctrine, such as
Curran and Huddleston, remain viable if the issue at bar concerns the implication of a
federal right of action. On the other hand, the court made clear that its "observations
on the acquiescence doctrine indicate [the doctrine's] limitations as an expression of
congressional intent." Id. at 1453. This and similar language along with the tenor of the
Court's opinion compel the conclusion that the doctrine, as reflected in Curran and
Huddeston, is in dire need of resuscitation.
42 114 S. Ct. at 1452 ("Congress has not reenacted the language of § 10(b) since
1934, however, so we need not determine whether the other conditions for applying the
reenactment doctrine are present.").
43 I. at 1452-53. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
S. 647, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 507 (1990), amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
45 See, e.g., Insider Trading Sanctions Act, H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1984),
amending, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1988)
(amending § 15(c)(4) to enable the SEC to proceed against any person who is deemed
a "cause" of a subject party's failure to comply).
46 See Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 390 (5th Cir. 1982).
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tive history' usually will set forth the revisions, thereby making
resort to the legislative reenactment doctrine superfluous.
On a related subject, language in Central Bank of Denver indicates that legislative history of even the Congress that enacted the
pertinent legislation is immaterial unless the text of the statutory
provision fails to resolve the matter at issue." By foreclosing aiding and abetting liability in private actions under section 10(b)
based solely on the text of the statute,4" the Court adhered to
this restrictive proposition. This confining rationale dictates that
Congress must include every eventuality when enacting a particular
statute, or risk that the judiciary will hold that the statute fails to
encompass the relief requested, even if such relief is favorably
viewed by that and subsequent Congresses.' Such a wooden construction ignores the realities of the political process, demands a
"crystal ball" approach from the Congress enacting the legislation,
ill serves a body as eminent as the Supreme Court, and frustrates
the effectuation of legitimate, if not sometimes noble, public policy objectives.5

47 Following Central Bank of Denver's rationale, if the text of the statute resolves the
issue, the legislative history is not material. 114 S. Ct. at 1446-48; infra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the Court in Central Bank of Denver reaffirmed its distaste
for reliance on legislative history of a subsequent Congress: "'We have observed on more
than one occasion that the interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or
Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of
that statute.'" 114 S. C. at 1452 (quoting Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v.
Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)).
48 114 S. C. at 1448.
49 Id.(stating that "the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid
and abet a § 10(b) violation [and] we think that conclusion resolves the case.").
50 Id.("It is inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text."). See supra notes 43-47
and accompanying text.
51 For this author's critique of the Supreme Court's unduly restrictive approach in
the implied rights and securities law areas, see, e.g., Marc 1. Steinberg, Implied Private
Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55

NOTRE DAME

LAW. 33, 44-52 (1979);

Marc I.

Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 557, 560-71 (1982); Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of 'Security': The 'Context' Clause, 'Investment Contract' Analysis,
and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 503-39 (1987); Marc I. Steinberg & William
A. Reece, The Supreme Court, Implied Rights of Action, and Proxy Regulation, 54 OHIO ST. LJ.
67 (1993).
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GENERAL PRECLUSION OF AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILIy
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

As noted in Central Bank of Denver, the Supreme Court held
that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not provide for the
imposition of aiding and abetting liability in private litigation.52
The Court clarified that its decision was based on "a strict statutory construction " " and that the issue before it involved "the scope
of conduct prolibited by § 10(b)."54 Importantly, the Court's rationale precludes imposition of aiding and abetting liability by
private plaintiffs for alleged violations of other federal securities
law provisions."s Moreover, the Court's restrictive approach may
extend to the SEC, thereby precluding the Commission from
bringing enforcement actions premised on aider and abettor liability (except where a statute expressly provides for such liability)6

52 114 S. Ct. at 1446-55. For law review commentary prior to Central Bank of Denver,
see Douglas M. Branson, Collateral ParticipantLiability Under the Securities Laws - Charting the
Proper Course 65 OR. L. Ray. 327 (1986); Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding
and Abetting Securities. Fraud: A CriticalExamination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637 (1988); William H.
Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws - Aiding and Abetting Conspiracy,
Controlling Person and Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L.
313 (1988); Dennis S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiray, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597

(1972).
53 114 S. Ct. at 1446-48.
54 Id.
55 After examining sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act and sections 9, 16, 18,
and 20A of the Exchange Act, the Court concluded that none of these express causes of
actions provided for aider and abettor liability. Id. at 1448-50. Moreover, the Court's
analysis in Central Bank of Denver certainly should extend to other implied causes of action, such as section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. Indeed, the statutory language of section 14(a), like that of section 10(b), "controls" and "bodes ill" for litigants who seek to
hold collateral parties liable as aiders and abettors. Id. at 1447. The same holds true for
SEC enforcement actions based on violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act.
The Court's decision should also preclude use of the common law theories of conspiracy and respondeat superior. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, lower,court
decisions recognizing these theories of liability "appear unlikely to survive the Court's
decision." Id. at 1460 n.12. See generally David Waksman, Comment, Causation Concerns in
Civil Conspiracy to Violate Rule 10b-5, 66 N.Y.U. L REV. 1505 (1991); sources cited supra
note 52.
56 See Thomas 0. Gorman, Whos Afraid of lOb-5? The Scope of a Section 10(b) Cause of
Action After Central Bank of Denver, 22 SEC. REG. LJ. 247 (1994); Olson, supra note 1, at
5; see generally Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L REv. 961 (1994). But see
Bromberg, supra note 10, at 138 (stating that "[a] likely rationale [for holding that the
Commission has authority to pursue aiders and abettors] is that the criminal aid-abet statute gives sufficient support for government enforcement when it does not for private civil
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Notwithstanding the holding in Central Bank of Denver, discussion of aider and abettor liability principles should be undertaken
for a number of reasons. First, the SEC arguably may pursue aiders and abettors since it may not be limited by Central Bank of
Denver. In any event, the SEC has statutory authority to proceed
administratively against broker-dealers (and associated persons)
who aid and abet securities law violations. 7 Second, the SEC may
also procure injunctions against those who aid and abet violations
of the Investment Advisers Act. 8 Third, although the SEC's cease
and desist power against those who are a "cause" of an alleged
violation evidently is more expansive than aider and abettor liability principles,5 9 the SEC still may draw on some of these principles to ascertain the parameters of the liability net. Fourth, a number of 6°state securities statutes provide for aiding and abetting
liability.
Prior to Central Bank of Denver, the lower federal courts overwhelmingly held that aiding and abetting liability was appropriate
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 6' Although courts differed on the precise content of the various elements of aiding and
abetting liability,62 three basic prerequisites emerged: (1) a prima-

enforcement.").
57 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(b) (4) (E), 15(b) (6) (A)(i), 15 U.S.C. §§
78o(b) (4) (E), 78o(b) (6) (A) (i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (civil penalty may be assessed
against broker-dealer aiding and abetting certain violations of the Exchange Act).
58 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); see also SEC Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1994) (providing, inter alia,
that the SEC may suspend or bar any person from practicing before it if such person is
found by the Commission to have willfully aided and abetted a violation of any federal
securities statute, rule, or regulation). Under this provision, SEC case law has developed
with respect to the requirements for finding aider and abettor liability. See In re Carter &
Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
82,847 (Feb. 21, 1981). After Central Bank of Denver, parties may challenge that
the SEC has no authority to discipline aiders and abettors under Rule 2(e). Cf MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1992) (prohibiting an attorney from aiding and abetting a client's fraudulent conduct).
59 See Alan A. Martin, et al., SEC Enforcement Powers and Remedies Are Greatly Expanded,
19 SEC. REG. L.J. 19, 23 (1991) (stating that the concept of a "cause" of a violation in
relation to the SEC's cease and desist authority "would appear to go far beyond traditional concepts of aiding and abetting violations.").
60 See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(F)(2) (West 1977); JOSEPH C.
LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 7.08 (1993). A number of state statutes are more expansive and
impose liabilities on those who "materially aid" the sale. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
61 See cases cited supra note 5.
62 Compare Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), with
Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
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ry securities law violation by another; (2) substantial assistance by
the alleged aider and abettor in the commission of the primary
violation; and (3) requisite "knowledge" on the part of such alleged aider and abettor that his conduct was improper.'
In determining whether the requisite knowledge had been
shown,' reckless conduct 5 sufficed if a fiduciary relationship
existed between the complainant and the alleged aider and abettor.' Absent a fiduciary relationship, a number of courts required
conscious intent,67 particularly if the alleged violator's role constituted "'the daily grist of the mill."'" In contrast, other courts
found recklessness to suffice where the alleged aider and abettor
had reason to foresee that third parties would be relying on her
conduct6 9 or where she derived financial benefit from the wrongdoing.70 Still other courts, as a general principle,
allowed reckless
7
conduct to satisfy the "knowledge" requirement. '

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit required that the plaintiff "show that each person alleged
to be an aider, abetter, or conspirator himself committed one of the 'manipulative or
deceptive' acts or otherwise met the standards of direct liability." Barker v. Henderson,
Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986).
63 See, e.g., 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1456 n.1 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cases cited);
supra note 5.
64 Questions also arose as to whether the defendant's conduct constituted "substantial assistance." For a narrow view, see Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991)
(lawyer drafting of key documents was not substantial assistance), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1475 (1992). This narrow view was largely rejected, even by those courts which otherwise
adhered to a restrictive approach. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th
Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989).
For a case dealing with whether a bank's participation constituted substantial assistance,
see K & S Partnership v. Continental Bank, NA, 952 F.2d 971, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1991),
crt. denied, 112 S. CL 2993 (1992).
65 Courts generally have adopted the "highly" reckless standard, defined as conduct
that represents "'an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care . . . to the
extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.'" Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 156970 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (cases cited).
66 See, e.g., Abe!l 858 F.2d 1104.
67 See, e.g., Schatz, 943 F.2d 485.
68 Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Woodward v. Metro
Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975)). See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992); Abell 858 F.2d 1104.
69 See, e.g., Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v.
Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1988), affd, 891 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 942 (1990); Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen,
Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Conn. 1987).
70 See, e.g., Walck v. American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778, 791 n.18 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780
(3d Cir. 1976).
71 See, e.g., Stem v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977);
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In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of
Denver, private parties and the SEC increasingly will assert theories
of liability based on primary violations. Hence, where a party
makes an affirmative statement, such as an attorney rendering an
opinion letter,7 2 primary liability exposure is clear.73 When one
solicits the purchase for the financial benefit of the securities
owner or one's own financial benefit, then liability under section
12 of the Securities Act may be incurred.74 In addition, because
executive officers "make policy and generally carry authority to
bind the corporation[,] ....
[t]heir action in behalf of the corporation is therefore primary ....
Similarly, under the "group published" theory, those officers
who are actively involved in a corporation's affairs may be subject
to primary liability for disclosure deficiencies contained in such
entity's prospectuses, press releases, and documents filed with the
SEC. 76 The Sixth Circuit's "direct contacts" test also will allow
complainants to assert that those who are deemed to have "furnished" documents to investors are subject to liability as primary
participants. 77 This rationale encompasses attorneys who draft

see also, SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979);
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). Coven and Spectrum stand for the
proposition that in SEC injunctive actions, if the primary violation does not require scienter, neither does the secondary aiding and abetting violation. These cases evidently are
no longer good law.
72 See, e.g., Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994), petition for
cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3161 (Aug. 29, 1994); see generally SCOTr FrrzGIBBON & DONALD W.
GLAZER, LEGAL OPINIONS (1992); MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES MALpltAcrlcE (1992); Darrel A. Rice & Marc I. Steinberg, Legal Opinions in Securities Transactions, 16 J. CORP. L. 375 (1991).
73 See, e.g., Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (attorney who rendered opinion letter subject to liability under § 10(b) as primary violator); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1125 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "an attorney is rarely
liable to any third party for his or her legal work unless the attorney has prepared a
signed 'opinion' letter designed for the use of a third party."), vacated on other grounds,
492 U.S. 914 (1989), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989).
74 See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988) (defining a seller as including one
"who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his
own financial interests or those of the securities owner.").
75 Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 182 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing
Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 561 (1st Cir. 1978)).
76 See, e.g., Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987); Morse
v. Abbott Lab., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,139 (N.D. Ill.
1994). See also In re Medeva Sec. Litig., [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 98,323 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("group published" doctrine used to state claim under Exchange Act controlling person provision § 20(a)).
77 SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1982).
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documents with the anticipation that such documents will be provided to investors.'8
Another approach focuses primary liability exposure on those
persons who sufficiently participate in the making of the allegedly
offensive statement (or omission) so as to be deemed a party who
in fact "made" such statement (or omission)." Hence, while uncertainty prevails regarding whether certain of these theories will
be embraced by the federal courts on a widespread basis, the fact
remains that private litigants and the SEC will seek to devise effective strategies in their efforts to emerge victorious.
IV.

THE REJECTION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILrTY?

Today, the overwhelming majority of federal appellate courts
have accepted the common law doctrine of respondeat superior in
the federal securities law context." In view of the Supreme

78 See, e.g., Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991);
In 7e Rospatch Sec. Litig., 802 F.Supp. 110 (W.D. Mich. 1992). As the Sixth Circuit set
forth in Molecular Technologj
Applying section 10(b)/rule 10b-5 principles to [the attorney] Snyder's
involvement with the SDE shell transaction leads us to conclude that sufficient
evidence was introduced to create a triable fact issue for the jury. [Attorney]
Snyder drafted the merger agreement between State Die and Extra Production
at the August 11, 1983 meeting between himself, Al Valentine and DeWorth
Williams. At that meeting, Snyder took notes which indicated that Snyder knew
that 60,000 shares (representing about 90% of the outstanding shares) of State
Die stock were in escrow, Snyder was aware that the title to the real property of
State Die, which was part of the consideration in the merger with Extra Production, was held by an unrelated leasing company and, thus, not transferable;
Snyder contemplated obtaining State Die's most recent annual report, a corporate certificate of good standing, tax returns, etc. (although he never obtained
any such documents); and Snyder knew that State Die had substantial debts,
including one $194,000 bank debt. Snyder did not disclose any of this information in the amended offering circular. Taking this evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could find that [the attorney]
Snyder knew certain information in the amended offering circular was misleading and that Snyder had a duty to disclose that information to investors such as
the plaintiffs under 10(b)/rule lOb-5. Furthermore, Snyder's participation in
editing the information statement prepared for the purpose of marketing SDE's
stock in the OCT market, and in drafting an opinion letter for SDE's board of
directors regarding the tradeability of common stock, while not overwhelming,
also implicated him in the alleged fraudulent scheme.
Molecular Technology, 925 F.2d at 918.
79 See John C. Coffee, Securities Law, NAT'L LJ., July 11, 1994, at B4, B7.
80 See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (9th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (cases cited); MARC I. STEINBERG, SECUITrIEs REGULATION: LIABILrrEs AND
REMEDIEs § 10.04 (1994) (cases cited).
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Court's Central Bank of Denver decision, the continued vitality of
respondeat superior liability is open to debate, if not emasculated.
Central Bank of Denver disallows private actions based on aiding and
abetting under section 10(b). The Court's language and tenor
signify that other common law theories of liability, unless provided
for by statute, likewise will be rejected."
This assertion is evidenced further by the Supreme Court's
focus on the statutorily provided corntrolling person provision of
the Exchange Act. In this regard, the Court stated:
Congress did not overlook secondary liability when it created
the private rights of action in the 1934 Act. Section 20 of the
1934 Act imposes liability on "controlling persons" .....
This
suggests that "[w]hen Congress wished to create such [secondary] liability, it had little trouble doing so ....
As Justice Stevens recognized in his dissent, the majority's rationale suggests that lower court decisions recognizing respondeat
superior liability "appear unlikely to survive." 8
Even if the federal courts ultimately reject the doctrine of
respondeat superior liability, it may be useful to examine this issue
from the standpoint of state securities law.84 Moreover, when executive officers of a corporation or persons of similar status in any
like enterprise improperly act with actual or apparent authority
within the course and scope of their employment, such enterprise
may well be held primarily liable. As stated by the Third Circuit,
executive officers make policy and generally have the authority to
bind the corporation; therefore, "It]heir action in behalf of the
corporation is...
primary, and holding a corporation liable for
their actions does not require respondeat superior. " '

81 See Richard A. Booth, Vicarious Liability and Securities Fraud, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 347
(1995); Arthur F. Mathews, Securities Laws, NAT'L LJ., May 23, 1994, at B4, B6.
82 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1451-52 (1994).
83 Id.at 1460 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The same holds true for the common
law theory of conspiracy. Id.
84 See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33M (West 1994) ("The rights and
remedies provided by this Act are in addition to any other rights (including exemplary
or punitive damages) or remedies that may exist at law or in equity.").
85 Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 182 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing
Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 560-61 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938
(1982)).
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V.

RAMIFICATIONS ON

SEC ENFORCEMENT

As a general proposition, in view of the Supreme Court's
decision in Central Bank of Denver, a persuasive argument exists
that the SEC may not bring an enforcement action premised on
aider and abettor liability. Although the Court's holding was confined to private parties, its rationale may extend to SEC actions.8
The Court's strict statutory construction in Central Bank of Denve8
is akin to the situation present in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.
There, the Court, applying a strict statutory construction to ascertain the requisite mental state in private actions for damages under section 10(b), held that scienter must be shown. 9 Thereafter,
applying Hochfelder's rationale, the Court in Aaron v. SEC'° held
that scienter must be proven in SEC enforcement actions for violation of section 10(b). 1 Following this logic, it appears that the
SEC, except where a statute so provides (such as with respect to
the broker-dealer and investment adviser contexts), may no longer
institute an enforcement action based on aider and abettor liability. Nonetheless, unlike the Hochfelder/Aaron scienter scenario, aiding and abetting a federal securities law violation statutorily gives
rise to criminal liability exposure. Accordingly, under this rationale, the criminal aid-abet statute provides ample authority for the
SEC to pursue aiders and abettors.92
The Supreme Court's strict statutory rationale in Central Bank
of Denver may well extend to other common law theories of liability. These theories include conspiracy and respondeat superior.93
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, lower court decisions
which recognize liability based upon conspiracy and respondeat

86

See sources cited supra note 56. But see Bromberg, supra note 10, at 133.

87 114 S. Ct. at 1446-47.
88 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
89
90
91

Id. at 201.
446 U.S. 680 (1980).
Id. at 689-95.

92 See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988) ("Whoever commits an offense against the' United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."); Overturning Central Bank Seen Part of Litigation Reform Process, 26 Sec.

Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1121 (1994) (remarks of SEC General Counsel Simon Lome);
Bromberg, supra note 10, at 136 (pointing to criminal aid-abet statute as grounds for
recognizing SEC authority to pursue aiders and abettors); supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
93

See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974).
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superior "appear unlikely to survive the Court's decision."94 In
light of these developments, it remains to be seen the degree to
which parties subject to SEC injunctions will seek to dissolve such
injunctions based on a change in the governing law.9"
Irrespective of the discussion above, the SEC retains an impressive enforcement arsenal. Foremost, the SEC may bring an
administrative cease and desist proceeding against persons who are
a "cause" of the alleged violation. This enforcement weapon encompasses those persons who "should have known" that their conduct "would contribute" to such violation.9 6 Hence, even though
the SEC must proceed administratively, it should be able to spread
the liability net as to embrace such persons who should have
known their conduct would contribute to a violation. After all,
establishing one as a "cause" of a violation should be easier than
97
proving aider and abettor liability.

Additionally, in view of section 15(b) (4) (E) and section
15(b) (6)(A) of the Exchange Act,9" the Commission has express
statutory authority to proceed against brokers and dealers (and
associated persons) who aid and abet securities law violations.'
Hence, Central Bank of Denver should have minimal impact on the
SEC's enforcement program directed at financial intermediaries.
This is especially true given the Commission's rigorous use of the
controlling person and failure to supervise provisions to hold broker-dealer executives, supervisors, and branch managers accountable. 100

94 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1460 n.12 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95 See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992); United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1934); SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1978);
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., Inc., 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969); Marc 1.
Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions - Standards for Their Imposition, Modification
and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 27 (1980).
96

See MARC I. STEINBERG

& R. FERRARA,

SECURmES PRACTCE: FEDERAL AND

STATE

ENFORCEMENT § 5A.01 et seq. (1985 & 1994 Supp.).
97 See Martin, supra note 59, at 23.
98 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (4) (E), 78o(b) (6) (A) (i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
99 Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (civil penalty may be assessed against broker-dealer aiding and abetting certain violations of 1934 Act). Those
who aid and abet violations of the Investment Advisors Act also are subject to SEC enforcement action. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d) (1988).
100 See, e.g., In re Goldman Sachs & Co., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 85,312 (1994); In re Prudential Securities, Inc., [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,238 (1993); In re PaineWebber, Inc., [1992-1993 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,110 (1993); In re Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,067 (1992); Martin L. Budd & Sharon S. Tisher, Superisiy Liability, 26 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG. 109 (1993); Ralph S. Janvey, The Feuerstein
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Prior to Central Bank of Denver, the Commission was content in
many cases to allege aider and abettor liability. Now, one may expect the SEC to seek an expansion of conduct that constitutes
primary liability. For example, the Sixth Circuit's "direct contacts"
test provides the Commission (and private plaintiffs) an opportunity to assert primary liability against professionals who, through
their participation in the drafting of documents, are deemed to
have "furnished" such documents to investors, thereby becoming
primary participants."' In sum, although Central Bank of Denver
will have an adverse effect, the SEC's enforcement program will
remain vigorous.0 2
VI.

BLUE SKY LAWS: A PREFERRED ROUTE FOR
INVESTOR-LITIGANTS?

Due to the restrictive decisions handed down by the Supreme
Court under the federal securities laws," 3 the question arises
whether investors should consider pursuing state law actions with
greater vigor. If claims are brought in state court, plaintiffs may
0 4 The defenjoin their federal Securities Act causes of action."

Report of Investigation: Supervisoy Responsibilities of Legal and Compliance Officers of Brokerage

Firms, 21 SEC. REG. LJ. 166 (1993); John H. Sturc & Josiah 0. Hatch, 1I, From Counselor
to Supervisor The Feuerstein Section 21(a) Report Expands Liability for Inside Counse 26 REV.
SEC. & CoMM. REG. 45 (1993).
101 See Central Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. at 1455 ("Any person or entity, including a
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller relies may be liable as a primary
violator under lOb-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule
10b-5 are met."); supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
102 See Barrett, supra, note 1, at A2. On the other hand, see Central Bank of Denver,
114 S. Ct at 1460 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the SEC as Amicus
Curiae: "The Commission reports that it asserted aiding and abetting claims in fifteen
percent of its civil enforcement proceedings in fiscal year 1992, and that elimination of
aiding and abetting would 'sharply diminish the effectiveness of Commission actions.'").
103 See supra notes 14-21, 30-36 and accompanying text. Under the applicable state's
definition of the term "security," it is possible that a security may exist under state but
not federal law (or under federal but not state law). See Riedel v. Bancam, S.A., 792 F.2d
587, 593-94 (6th Cir. 1986) (although CDs issued by a Mexican bank are not a security
under federal law, CDs were securities "under the broadly drafted" Ohio Securities Act);
Saunders, Lewis & Ray v. Evans, 512 N.E.2d 59 (Il1. App. Ct. 1989) (even though corporate stock is a security under federal law, it is not a security under state law unless
acquiror is a "passive investor"). See generally JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 2.01 et
seq. (1993); Douglas M. Branson & Niarl S. Okamoto, The Supreme Court's Literalism and
the Definition of -Security" in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043 (1993); Manning G. Warren, 1I, The Treatment of Reves "Notes" and Other Securities Under the State Blue
Sky Laws, 47 Bus. LAw. 321 (1991).
104 Such Securities Act causes of action include those provided by sections 11, 12,
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dants, in turn, have no right to remove the case to federal
court.1

05

In some situations, plaintiffs should pursue their grievances
under the federal securities acts. For example, the state of New
York declines to recognize a private right of action for violation of
its securities laws."o In addition, other state statutes provide private redress for purchasers only,1 17 allow for a shorter statute of
limitations than that prescribed by federal law"0 8 and do not recognize aider and abettor liability against certain collateral parties."° Moreover, by premising liability upon the status of the
primary violator as a seller, many of these statutes arguably cannot
be invoked against a corporate defendant and its fiduciaries in secondary market frauds, such as when a company allegedly issues a
deliberately false press release or earnings statement.'
Adoption
of a sufficiently broad definition of "seller" in this context would
expand the statute's scope to encompass such situations.1"

and 15. Most courts decline to imply a private right of action under section 17(a) of the
Act. See, e.g., Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982).
105 See Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988); Carson v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,816
(D. Kan. 1990); see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990) (bolding that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims).
On the other hand, actions raising Securities Exchange Act claims (e.g., such as §
10(b) claims) are subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988); infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. See also
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) (observing that "[i]f state preclusion includes this requirement of prior jurisdictional competency, which is generally true, a state judgment will not have claim preclusive effect on a
cause of action within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts").
106 See CPC Int'l v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1987).
107 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (1991), construed in Weidner v. Engelhart,
176 N.W.2d 509, 513 (N.D. 1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Anderson 1992); see
also UNIF. SECURrrIES Acr § 410(a), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1985), reprinted in 1 Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 5500, at 1566 (1985).
108 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 97-114(d) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.411(e)
(Vernon 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(f) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522(D)
(Michie 1993); Clouser v. Temporaries, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding
claim was barred by the two-year District of Columbia blue sky statute of limitations, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 2-2613(e) (1994)).
109 See, e.g., Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt and Heuer, P.C., 713 F. Supp. 1019, 102728 (W.D. Mich. 1989), af'd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Michigan Uniform Securities Act); Allen v. Columbia Financial Management, Ltd., 377 S.E. 2d 352, 356
(S.C. Ct. App. 1988).
110 Hence, many states have adopted the section 12(2) counterpart but have declined
to provide a private remedy for the rule lob-5 counterpart. Compare TEX. REV. CIr. STAT.
ANN. art. 581-33A(2) (West 1994) (section 12(2) counterpart), with WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 21.20.010 (West 1989) (rule lOb-5 counterpart).
111 For example, holding that a company issuing a materially misleading press release
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Another significant disadvantage to state law involves class
action litigation. Unlike federal law which recognizes the fraud-onthe-market theory to create a presumption of reliance 2 which
facilitates use of the class action mechanism,"' a number of state
courts have declined to adopt this doctrine with respect to actions
alleging common law fraud." 4 The consequence is that individu-

aided the sale, played an integral role in the sale, or solicited the transaction for its
financial benefit would, depending upon the standard adopted, confer "seller" status upon the entity, thereby subjecting it to liability exposure in secondary open market transactions.
112 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). In Bask, the Court concluded:
An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in
reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material
misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5
action.
Id. at 247.
Because many of the blue sky remedial statutes do not have a reliance requirement,
this issue" under state law most frequently arises with respect to common law fraud
claims. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
113

485 U.S. at 242-47. See MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 139-40

(1989):
The Supreme Court's decision in Basic recognized the reality of the modem securities markets involving the trading of hundreds of millions of shares on a
daily basis and that most ordinary investors do not read corporate reports or
press releases. Acknowledging the presence of impersonal trading markets, the
Court relied in part on economic theory and empirical studies to support its
holding. In so ruling, the Court promoted the use of the class action to redress
Section 10(b) violations. If the Court had required positive proof of individualized reliance from each plaintiff, individual issues may have predominated over
the common ones, thereby precluding the pursuit of class actions in this context. Hence, the Court's decision looked to policy grounds as well to help ensure that ordinary investors have a viable recourse when they are defrauded in
the impersonal trading markets.
Id. at 139-40. See generally Roger D. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (1984); C. Edward Fletcher,
III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE LJ. 1081.
114 Hence, because many blue sky remedial statutes do not have a reliance requirement, this issue most frequently arises with respect to common law fraud claims. See, e.g.,
Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1163 n.17 (3d Cir. 1986) ("While the fraud on the market
theory is good law with respect to the Securities Acts, no state courts have adopted the
theory, and thus direct reliance remains a requirement of a common law securities fraud
claim."); Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (same);
Antonson v. Robertson, 141 F.R.D. 501, 508 (E.D. Kan. 1991); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858
P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993); Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 474 (Del. 1992). But see In
re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,485 (C.D.
Cal. 1989) (interpreting California law); Hurley v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 719 F.
Supp. 27, 34 n.4 (D. Mass. 1989); OHIO Rsv. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Anderson 1992) (no
reliance requirement); Arnold v. Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
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alized proof of reliance is required, which militates against class
certification. For example, the California Supreme Court rejected
the fraud-on-the-market theory in cases alleging common law fraud
because it would eliminate the reliance requirement."5 Similarly,
the Delaware Supreme Court has held that "[a] class action may
not be maintained in a purely common law or equitable fraud
case since individual questions of law or fact, particularly as to the
element of justifiable reliance, will inevitably predominate over
common questions of law or fact.""1
The availability of classwide treatment for plaintiff-investors in
state securities and common law fraud cases has taken on greater
significance with the Supreme Court's determination that section
1
10(b) actions have a relatively short statute of limitations."
The
practical consequence of state court cases mandating individualized
proof of reliance is that investors whose federal and state securities
law claims are time-barred will also be prevented from obtaining
class certification to bring their state common law action. This
result is correct in cases where prospective complainants sit on
their rights. Such a result is unjust, however, in cases of fraudulent
concealment where aggrieved investors may not learn of the fraud

115 Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993). Importantly, the court recognized
that the state securities law provisions discussed at bar contained no reliance requirement. See supra notes 113-14; infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
116 Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 611 A.2d 467, 474 (Del. 1992). As stated by a federal
court interpreting state law: "[I~n the absence of an analogous state law doctrine of
fraud on the market, each individual plaintiff would be required to prove his or her
individual reliance, causing individual questions of fact to predominate in the case."
Antonson v. Robertson, 141 F.R.D. 501, 508 (E.D. Kan. 1991). See Peil v. Speiser, 806
F.2d 1154, 1163 n.17 (3d Cir. 1986) ("While the fraud on the market theory is good law
with respect to the Securities Acts, no state courts have adopted the theory, and thus
direct reliance remains a requirement of a common law securities fraud claim."). But see
Arnold v. Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). Accord Hurley v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 719 F. Supp. 27, 34 n.4 (D. Mass. 1989) ("Defendants' argument that the
fraud on the market substitute for actual reliance only applies to the federal securities
fraud claim, not the common law fraud claim, is unavailing."); cases cited supra note 114.
Anbther downside is that at this time there is a relative scarcity of state court reported decisions addressing the blue sky laws. See Wayne Klein, The Idaho Securities Act: An
Analysis of Idaho Courts' Securities Opinions, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 95, 111 (1992-1993) ("Securities litigation at the state level generally yields relatively few reported decisions.").
117 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991)
(construing statute of limitations for § 10(b) (1934 Act) claims to be within one year
after discovery and in no event more than three years after the violation), reh'g denied,
501 U.S. 1277 (1991); see also Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988) (providing statute of limitations for §§ 11 and 12(2) claims of one year after plaintiffs knew
or should have known of the violation and in no event more than three years after such
violation).
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until several years (and even decades) after the event.118 Given
this reality, state courts and legislatures should recognize that
using the fraud-on-the-market theory in common law fraud actions
ensures that unsophisticated investors have a forum to redress
their grievances." 9
On the other hand, there may be several distinct advantages
12
for plaintiffs who bring state blue sky and common law claims. 1
Importantly, many state securities acts provide that, if appropriate,
successful plaintiffs may recover reasonable attorneys' fees and
punitive damages.12 1 Another significant advantage relates to the
statute of limitations issue. In Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson," the Supreme Court held that the statute
of limitations under section 10(b) is one year from the date that

118 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (fraud discovered decades later).
119 See cases cited supra note 114. Thus, a number of recent cases provide plaintiffs
with some hope of receiving class certification of their common law claims. In one such
decision, In re College Bound Consol. Litig., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) J[ 98,328 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), the Court stated:
Defendants contend that...

the named plaintiffs' claims are untypical of

the proposed class . . . . [D]efendants argue that the named plaintiffs' manner

of reliance on the alleged misrepresentations and omissions - that is, reliance
on the market price of College Bound stock is not typical of the reliance of
other members of the proposed class. Similarly, defendants argue that the state
common law fraud claims are unsuitable for class certification because they raise
individualized issues of reliance. However, the existence of individualized issues
of reliance cannot defeat a motion for class certification. If necessary, this court
can conduct separate trials on the issue of reliance. Therefore, there is no need
to address at this time the existence of different theories of reliance, much less
address the merits of any particular theory.
Id. at 90,268 (citations omitted), relying on Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d
Cir. 1968); Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (D. Conn. 1988).
120 See Douglas M. Branson, Collateral ParticipantLiability Under State Securities Laws, 19
PEPP. L. REv. 1027 (1992).
121 See, e.g., UNIF. SECURITIES Acr § 410(a), supra note 107, at 1566; ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 44-2001 (1994); WASH. REv. CODE § 21.20.430(1), (2) (West 1989). Punitive damages also may be awarded in appropriate situations, such as where malice or egregious
fraud is shown. See OHIO REv. CODE AMN. § 2315.21(B) (Anderson 1992); Price v. Griffin,
359 A.2d 582, 589-90 (D.C. C. App. 1976); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(2) (1993)
(providing for the award of treble damages if violation was reckless or intentional). Moreover, little RICO and related statutes may be invoked in certain states. See, e.g., DOUGLAS
E. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF CIrVL RICO 411-505 (1991). As another example, treble damages
may be available under Texas law pursuant to that state's Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (West
1987); see also E.F. Hutton & Company v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. 1987) (argument that DTPA does not apply to securities transactions not timely raised).
122 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
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the plaintiff discovered the facts constituting the violation and in
no event more than three years after the violation."2 Equitable
tolling, the Court held, is not permitted. 24
A similar statute of limitations applies to claims brought under the Securities Act, including those brought pursuant to section
12(2). 125 By contrast, under "section 12(2)/section 10(b) types"
of statutes, many of the state blue sky statutes contain a longer
statute of limitations. For example, Texas has a three year/five
year limitations period. The Texas statute provides a statute of
limitations barring such an action "more than three years after
discovery of the untruth or omission, or after discovery should
have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence; or more
than five years after the sale [or purchase]. " 26 Other more flexible statutes of limitations include those of Florida (two year/five
year),127 Michigan (two year/four year),128 Ohio (two year/four
year) ," California (one year/four year),"' and Pennsylvania
(one year/four year)."' As to outside limits, there appears to be
no equitable tolling allowed. 3 2 Nonetheless, for those statutes

123 Id. at 360-61 (selecting § 9(e) of the Exchange Act as the language to govern the
limitations period for § 10(b) actions).
124 Id. at 363. The Court reasoned that the three-year outside limit was incompatible
with equitable tolling principles.
125 See Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988) (providing statute of limitations for §§ 11 and 12(2) claims of one year after plaintiffs knew or should have
known of the violation and in no event more than three years after such violation).
126 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33H(2), (3) (West 1994). In addition, the Texas statute provides a limitations period of three years for registration violations. Id. art.
581-33H(1). By contrast, the Securities Act generally provides a one-year statute of limitations for actions brought under section 12(1) for registration violations. See Securities Act
of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
127 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4) (e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). Accord N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-13B-41 (Michie 1978) (two year/five year).
128 MICH. COMP. LAws § 451.810(e) (1989).
129 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Anderson 1992). For the two-year period in the
statute, at least under some circumstances, that period "begins to run upon the actual
discovery of the defect." Eastman v. Benchmark Minerals, Inc., 518 N.E.2d 23, 25 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1986).
130 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25506 (West 1977 & Supp. 1994).
131 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-504(a) (1993).
132 See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982) (interpreting
California statute); Gilbert Family Partnership v. NIDO Corp., 679 F. Supp. 679, 685
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (interpreting Michigan statute); Bull v. American Bank & Trust Co.,
641 F. Supp. 62, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (interpreting Pennsylvania statute); Puchner v. Bache
Halsey Stuart, Inc., 553 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Sorenson v. Tenuta,
577 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). But see HAROLD MARSH, JR. & ROBERT H.
VOLK, PRACICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAws § 14.08[2] [a], at 14-67 (1991)
(taking the position that equitable tolling may be permitted under the California statute).
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that contain a flat period (for example, that suit must be brought
within two years after the transaction), there is some authority that
the statute may be tolled due to the defendant's fraudulent concealment."' In cases of common law fraud, it is well established
that the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled."
Another example is that many state securities statutes provide
for monetary damages based on negligent material misrepresentations or omissions made in the initial offering context as well as
in the secondary trading markets."3 Under federal law, if section
10(b) is invoked, scienter must be shown." 6 In addition, many
state securities statutory counterparts are more expansive than
section 12(2). Accordingly, under a number of these statutes,
plaintiffs may have a four or five-year limitation period to bring an

133 See, e.g., Barton v. Peterson, 733 F. Supp. 1482, 1492-93 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (interpreting Georgia law); Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1277, 1304-05
(W.D. Mich. 1986) (construing § 410(e) of the Michigan Uniform Securities Act), afd,
829 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1987); McIntyre v. ILB Inv. Corp., 412 A.2d 810, 812-14 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1979). But see Cors v. Langham, 683 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (E.D. Va. 1988) (no
tolling of statute of limitations under Virginia Securities Act); Norden v. Friedman, 756
S.W.2d 158, 163 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (two-year statute of limitations is absolute under
Missouri securities statute).
134 See Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 64445 (Tex. 1988); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 378 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("Only a small minority of States constrain fraud actions with absolute periods of repose . . . ."), rehk denied, 501 U.S. 1277 (1991).
135 For example, the Washington Supreme Court in Kittilson v. Ford, 608 P.2d 264
(Wash. 1980) which involved a civil action for damages, rejected the Hochfelder scienter
standard. In distinguishing Hochfelder and holding that negligence is sufficient to impose
liability, the Kittilson court reasoned:
We believe the holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder [425 U.S. 185
(1976)] ...
[is] inapplicable to our Securities Act. First, the "manipulative or
deceptive" language of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act is not included in the
Washington act. Secondly, in contrast to the federal scheme, the language of
Rule 10b-5 is not derivative but is the statute in Washington. Finally, no legislative history similar or analogous to Congressional legislative history exists in
Washington.
Id. at 265. See Crook v. Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 40, 49 (N.D. Ind.
1983) (interpreting Indiana law); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bryne, 320
So.2d 436, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), nrit discharged, 341 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1976);
Fakhrdai v. Mason, 696 P.2d 1164, 1166-1167 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); see also Molecular
Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 920 n.7 (6th Cir. 1991); Branson, supra
note 120, at 1047 ("Under state securities laws' general antifraud statutes, allegation and
proof of mere negligence is the general state of mind requirement.").
136 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976).
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action based on negligently made statements in the secondary markets. 13
Although some state courts have followed the Supreme
Court's decision in Pinter v. Dahe"s for defining who is a "seller"
under the applicable state securities statute, 39 a number of states
adhere to the more expansive "substantial factor" test. 4° This
standard was used by several lower federal courts prior to Pinter
for defining the term "seller" under section 12 of the Securities
Act.' Under this test, one is deemed a "seller" if his or her
actions played an integral role or were a substantial contributing
factor in the transaction. Certainly, the liability net extends farther under this definition of "seller."
A number of the state statutes extend liability exposure to
those who materially aid in consummating the transaction.

137 See supra notes 126-31, 135 and accompanying text.
138 486 U.S. 622, 623 (1988) (defining seller under § 12(1) of the Securities Act as
extending to one "who successfully solicits a purchase, . . . motivated at least in part by
a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner"). Lower federal courts overwhelmingly have applied Pinter to section 12(2) actions. See, e.g., In re
Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 635-36 (3d Cir. 1989); Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1989); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d
Cir. 1988).
139 See, e.g., Baker, Watts & Co., v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356 (Md. C. Spec.
App. 1993); State v. Williams, 390 S.E.2d 746, 749 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Biales v. Young,
432 S.E.2d 482 (S.C. 1993); Allen v. Columbia Financial Management, Ltd., 377 S.E.2d
352, 355-56 (S.C. C. App. 1988). In addition, a number of federal courts, interpreting
state law, have adhered to the Pinter standard. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858
F.2d 1104, 1130-31 (5th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Louisiana law), vacated on other grounds,
492 U.S. 914 (1989), cert. denied 492 U.S. 918 (1989); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473,
479 (2d Cir. 1988) (interpreting Connecticut law). But see Lutheran Bhd. v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 829 S.W.2d 300, 306 (Tex. C. App. 1992), set aside on other grounds, 840
S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1992) (stating that Texas' § 12(2) counterpart, art. 581-33(A)(2) "applies if the defendant was any link in the chain of the selling process.").
140 See, e.g., Anders v. Dakota Land & Development Co., 380 N.W.2d 862, 867-68
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Price v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988); Wade v. Skipper's,
Inc., 915 F.2d 1324, 1327-28 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law); Hines v. Data
Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 20 (Wash. 1990); Hoffer v. State, 776 P.2d 963, 964-65
(Wash. 1989); Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1051-52
(Wash. 1988).
An even more expansive definition of "seller" may have been recognized in Lutheran Bhd v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 829 S.W.2d at 306. See supra note 139. But see Victor v.
Thomas White & Co., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,548, at
93,509 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (interpreting California law, court limited the term "seller" to
one who is in privity of contract with the purchaser). Accord Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677
F.2d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982) (interpreting California law).
141 See, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1067-68 (6th Cir. 1984)
(defining a seller as one who is integrally connected with or substantially involved in the
transaction).
142 Id.
143 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3)
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This concept of secondary liability is particularly important in view
of the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver which
foreclosed aiding and abetting liability in private actions under
section 10(b)."' Indeed, one who materially aids a sale under
such a state statute is subject to liability unless he or she meets
the reasonable care defense.' This standard may enable a plain-

(1980). The Arizona and Oregon statutes are discussed in Branson, supra note 120, at
1039, 1059-62. Ohio's statute may even be broader because it uses the term "aided" without the qualification "materially." See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Anderson 1992).
As stated in Riedel v. Acutote of Colorado, 773 F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio), affd, 947
F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1991):
Section 1707.43 permits a buyer, at his option, to void a sale of securities which
violated any part of Ohio's securities laws ....
As section 1707.43 applies to
anyone who "participated in or aided the seller in any way" in a sale violating
Ohio's securities laws, this provision is much broader than the parallel federal
provision . . . . Trivial violations [,however,] do not trigger this remedy ....
Id. at 1066 (citations omitted). In Roger v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 621 F.
Supp. 114, 118 (S.D. Ohio 1985), the court stated: "To recover under § 1707.43, Plaintiff
must establish that there has been a sale of a security in violation of the securities chapter, and that the violation materially affects the protection contemplated by the violated
provision." See Callaghan v. Class One, Inc., 567 N.E.2d 1036 (Ohio 1991); Pencheff v.
Adams, 449 N.E.2d 1277 (Ohio 1983); Baker v. Conlan, 585 N.E.2d 543 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990); Obenauf v. Cidco Investment Services, Inc., 561 N.E.2d 1070 (Ohio CL App.
1990); Perkowski v. Megas Corporation, 563 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); James B.
Farmer & Toba J. Feldman, Fraud in Securities Transactions: A Comparison of Civil Remedies
Under the Ohio Securities Act, the Uniform Securities Act, and the Federal Securities Acts, 49 U.
CIN. L. REv. 814, 821 (1980) ("The coverage of section 1707.43 is as broad as the
antifraud remedies available to the Ohio Division of Securities. Neither reliance nor scienter need be shown; both of these elements are subsumed in an objective materiality
test.").
See also, UNIF. SECURmiEs Acr § 410(a), supra note 107, which provides:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under subsection
(a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller
who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially
aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent
as the seller, unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof
that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist.
There is contribution as in cases of contract amoig the several persons so liable.
Consistent with federal law, state securities statutes provide for control person liability. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-14(c) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-40F (Michie
1994); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F(1) (West 1994); see generally JOSEPH C.
LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 7.08 (1993).
144 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439
(1994). See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
145 See sources cited supra note 143. For application of the reasonable care standard
as an affirmative defense, see, e.g., Arnold v. Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 426, 434-35 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979); McGarrity v. Craighill, 349 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Evens v.
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tiff to successfully reach certain parties who would avoid liability
under the federal securities laws either because they were not
"sellers" under the Pinter test or because they were aiders and
abettors rather than primary violators."
State securities provisions offer other key advantages to plaintiffs. For example, many states hold that applicable blue sky statutes do not require a showing of reliance, 47 thereby facilitating
class action certification.'
Plaintiffs may also dispense with proof
of loss causation in a number of states.' This more relaxed liability framework prompted one commentator to poignantly observe:
It would seem that a plaintiff bringing a suit under [the Florida statute] could rescind [the transaction] without a showing
of proximate cause, or any damage, or any scienter on the part
of the defendant ....

Was the intent of the Florida legislature

to create a system of investor insurance? 5 '
In addition to their state blue sky claims, investors may
emerge victorious when seeking relief on grounds of common law
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.
For example, in Virginia Bankshares, although defeated on their
federal and state securities law claims, the plaintiffs were awarded

Holtmann, 672 P.2d 1193 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8,
17-18 (Wash. 1990).
146 See, e.g., Price v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988) (holding that attorney's actions in an offering could be viewed as materially aiding the sale). But see Riedel v.
Acutate of Colorado, 773 F. Supp. 1055, 1066 (S.D. Ohio), aFfd, 947 F.2d 955 (6th Cir.
1991) (interpreting Ohio law, court stated that "an attorney providing professional services is not liable under Section 1707.43"), relying on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1707.431(A) (Anderson 1992); Leeth v. Decorator's Mfg., Inc., 425 N.E.2d 920, 923 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1979). Accord Biales v. Young, 432 S.E.2d 482 (S.C. 1993) (holding attorney
performing professional services not a seller under state securities statute); Baker, Watts
& Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 620 A.2d 356 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (same); see generally MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES MALPRACITICE (1992); Gary M. Berne
& Neil Bregenzer, Participants'Liability Under the Oregon Securities Law After Prince v. Brydon,
68 OR. L. REV. 885 (1989); Joseph C. Long, Developments and Issues in Civil Liability Under
Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 439 (1993).
147 See. e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25400, 25500 (West 1977); Mirkin v. Wasserman,
858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Anderson 1992); Roger v.
Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 114, 118 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (interpreting
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A(2) (West
1994); Anderson v. Vinson Exploration, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
148 See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
149 See E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Rousseff, 537 So.2d 978, 981 (Fla. 1989).
150 Marilyn B. Cane, Proximate Causation in Securities Fraud Actions for Rescission, FLA.
BAR Bus. Q. REP., Spring 1989, at 14.
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hefty damages on their breach of fiduciary duty claims."' In another case, even though not a purchaser or seller of stock, a
shareholder was entitled to bring a common law action for
fraud.'
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held that, although unsuccessful on their federal and state securities law claims, the
plaintiffs established a meritorious breach of fiduciary duty claim
against their broker.' In so holding, the court asserted that "the
[federal and state] securities fraud statutes do not co-opt the existence of separate claims under state fiduciary principles."'54
Generally, the state securities laws are likely to be invoked by
plaintiffs with greater frequency. Due to their more flexible construction, many of the state statutes provide the plaintiff with a
right of action where such right may be lacking under federal law.
Hence, the effect of the federal courts' restrictive approach with
respect to the remedial provisions of the Securities Acts may well
be to induce plaintiffs to file their actions in the state courts.
Given the broad relief awarded in some of these state court proceedings, the result may ultimately be more detrimental to defendants. Indeed, it is ironic that many plaintiffs, by electing to bring
suit in state court, may be better off than they were prior to the
time that the federal courts embarked on their restrictive approach.
Although plaintiffs may elect to bring their state claims along
with their federal securities law claims in federal district court, 55
an increasing number of complainants are declining this option.' Perhaps this result is due to perceptions that state judges

151 See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 342-48 (4th Cir. 1992).
152 See Gutman v. Howard Savings Bank, 748 F. Supp. 254, 266 (D.NJ. 1990) (interpreting New Jersey law, standing to bring common law fraud claim granted and reliance
may be shown in regard thereto where alleged misstatements were made directly to the
complainant); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 59.135 (1988) (granting standing to those injured
by fraudulent conduct "in connection with . . . the conduct of a securities business" irrespective of whether the complainant purchased or sold securities), discussed in Branson,
supra note 120, at 1045-46. But see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller to have standing to bring § 10(b) private
damages action).
153 Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042 (11th Cir. 1987).
154 I- at 1050 (interpreting Florida law).
155 Of course, there are situations where only state law claims are available, thus
mandating that suit be brought in state court (unless the requirements of diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction are met). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). One such example is where
the applicable statute of limitations has expired for the federal securities law claims but
not for the state law claims. See supra notes 108, 122-34 and accompanying text.
156 By bringing the action in state court, a plaintiff therefore bypasses remedies af-
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may be more inclined to permit issues to reach the jury and to
the relatively large number of significant damage verdicts awarded
in the state courts.1 57 Moreover, as evidenced by a number of decisions, the concern may exist that federal courts will construe the
state securities laws at bar consistently with and no broader than
federal law.'58 Such holdings provide an additional incentive for
plaintiffs to institute their actions in state court and seek more
remedial interpretations.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The time is ripe for congressional action. From the plaintiff/litigant's standpoint, the Supreme Court's decisions in
Lampf59 (setting forth a relatively short statute of limitations for
section 10(b) suits) and Central Bank of Denve?' (precluding the
imposition of aider and abettor liability in section 10(b) private
actions) spell disaster. From the defense perspective, the daily fare
of "cookie cutter" class action complaints routinely filed within
hours after a disappointing earnings announcement and the corresponding price drop in a company's stock, smacks of vexatious

forded by the Securities Exchange Act, such as section 10(b), due to that Act's provision
for exclusive federal jurisdiction. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. §
78aa (1988 & Supp. V 1993); supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. Electing to
forego Exchange Act remedies and opting for the state court forum calls for counsel and
client to address significant substantive and tactical questions.
157 See, e.g., Matt Moffett & Thomas Petzinger, Jr., Pennzoil Wins $10.53 Billion in Suit
Against Texaco; Verdict Is Called Highest Civil Judgment in History, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20,
1985, at 3.
With increasing frequency, the federal courts are granting motions to dismiss for
failure to plead fraud with particularity pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This trend should further induce plaintiffs to file their actions in state
court. For federal appellate decisions granting Rule 9(b) motions, see, e.g., Tuchman v.
DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061 (5th Cir. 1994); Farlow v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624
(7th Cir. 1990); Werner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1990). But see
Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992). See generally Richard E.
Brodsky, Pleading Requirements in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 24 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 1 (1991);
Richard G. Himelrick, Pleading Securities Fraud, 43 MD. L. REv. 342 (1984); William M.
Richman, et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason, 60 So. CAT L. REV. 959
(1987).
158 See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1130-31 (5th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Louisiana law), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
918 (1989); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 479 (2d Cir. 1988) (interpreting Connecticut
law); see generally Marc I. Steinberg, State Securities Laws: A Panacea for Investors?, 22 SEC.
REG. LJ. 53 (1994).

159
160

501 U.S. 1277 (1991).
114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
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litigation. 1 ' In addition, deep pockets (such as accountants and
attorneys) assert that the provision for joint and several liability
under the federal securities laws 62 causes them an unduly onerous hit since the principal wrongdoers frequently are insolvent.ls
Given the competing interests of the combatants, the concept of
"reform" remains ambiguous, if not unattainable. Nonetheless,
legislative action is needed and compromise is an essential ingredient. The solution eventually reached, although partially unsatisfactory to all constituencies, should take a step forward to provide
adequate redress to injured litigants without exacting undue
costs.,,

161 See Senate Panel Hears Views on Reducing Number of Frivolous Rule lOb-5 Actions, 25
Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) 847 (1993) (describing testimony of several corporate executives who asserted that "[s]uch lawsuits are prepared in advance of the events upon
which the action is based, composed generically on a word processing system with fill-inthe-blanks for the corporate defendant's name and relevant dates, and stock values");
sources cited supra note 13.
162 See, e.g., ,ecurities Act of 1933 §§ 11(f), 12, 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f), 1, o (1988);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 18(a)-(b), 20(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), r(a)-(b),
t(a) (1988). See also Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 113 S. Ct.
2085 (1993) (implying private right of contribution under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
163 See Brent Bowers & Udayan Gupta, Shareholder Suits Beset More Small Companies,
WALL ST. J., March 9, 1994, at BI ("Scouring the media for lower-than-projected earnings, a small number of law firms and their 'professional plaintiffs,' who own shares in
many companies, file complaints that typically allege the defendant company fraudulently
withheld or misrepresented important information."); Witnesses, Lawmakers Debate Need for
Securities Litigation Reforms, 26 Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) 1120 (1994) (referring to testimony of spokesperson for "Big Six" accounting firms who asserted that "joint and several
liability plays a role in 'prompting [Rule lOb-1 litigation' against 'deep pocket' accounting firms and 'forc[es] settlements that bear no relation to the merits'").
164 A number of congressional proposals have been advanced. See, e.g., Common
Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1994, S. 1976, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1994); see generally Stephen Power, Battle is Joined Over Securities-FraudBills, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1994, at
B6.

